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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is an Appeal of the District Court's decision that an Idaho Transportation 
Department Hearing Examiner had correctly determined that Mr. Ewing had not met his 
burden to demonstrate a basis existed under LC. § 18-8002A(7) to set aside the 
Department's Administrative License Suspension. 
b. Party References. 
The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "Department" for 
purposes of this argument. Mr. Ewing is specifically referred to by name. Where "driver" 
is used, it is in reference to drivers generally. 
c. Reference to the Administrative Record. 
The references to the Department's Administrative Record are made to the 
Appellate Record page number not the Administrative Record page number. The 
Transcript of the Department's Administrative hearing is included in the Record on Appeal 
as an exhibit. The transcript of that hearing is referred to as the Administrative License 
Suspension Transcript (ALS Tr.) by page and number. 
d. Factual Statement and Procedural History. 
On March 16, 2014 at Corporal Levi Frary was patrolling north near mile post 3.5 
on Lindsay Creek Road, Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. Corporal Frary observed a 
vehicle traveling south toward him speeding 44 mph in a posted 35 mph zone. Corporal 
Frary turned around and caught up to the vehicle and conducted a traffic stop (R. p. 42). 
Corporal Frary made contact with the driver of the vehicle later identified as Jeremy 
C. Ewing. While talking to Mr. Ewing, Corporal Frary noticed the smell of an alcoholic 
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beverage coming from the vehicle. Mr. Ewing's eyes appeared bloodshot and watery and 
his speech was slurred (R. p. 42). 
Corporal Frary asked Mr. Ewing if he'd had anything to drink, Mr. Ewing denied 
having anything to drink. Based on the smell of alcohol coming from the vehicle and 
Corporal Frary' s observations of Mr. Ewing, Corporal Frary asked Mr. Ewing to step 
outside of the vehicle to complete evidentiary testing. Mr. Ewing then admitted to 
consuming alcoholic beverages earlier in the evening (R. p. 42). 
Corporal Frary asked Mr. Ewing to perform the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, the 
Walk and Turn and One Leg Stand, Mr. Ewing failed the evidentiary testing (R. p. 43). 
Corporal Frary advised Mr. Ewing that he was detaining him for driving under the 
influence. Corporal Frary then began the 15 minute monitoring period and played the 
advisory audio recording. Mr. Ewing provided breath samples of .145 and .142. Corporal 
Frary then placed Mr. Ewing under arrest for driving under the influence (R. p. 43). 
Mr. Ewing timely requested a hearing with the Idaho Department of 
Transportation's administrative Hearing Examiner (R. pp. 51-55). 
A hearing was held telephonically on April 10, 2014 (R. p. 89). The Department's 
Hearing Examiner entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order sustaining the 
suspension of Mr. Ewing's driving privileges (R. pp. 281-290). 
Mr. Ewing timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Department's Hearing 
Examiner's decision (R. pp. 302-304). 
The District Court determined that Mr. Ewing had not met his burden pursuant to 
LC. § 18-8002A(7) sustaining the Administrative License Suspension entered by the 
Department's Hearing Examiner (R. p. 496). 
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Mr. Ewing timely filed his Notice of Appeal of the District Court's decision. The 
suspension of Mr. Ewing's driving privileges have been stayed pending the conclusion of 
the Court's judicial review. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Mr. Ewing identifies four issues on appeal. For purposes of the Department's 
response, the issues are characterized as follows: 
Issue 1: The validity of the Idaho State Police Breath Alcohol Testing Standard 
Operating Procedures. 
Issue 2: Due Process in the Administrative License Suspension Hearing process. 
Issue 3: Mr. Ewing's equal protection rights. 
Issue 4: Mr. Ewing's burden pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7)(d). 
Mr. Ewing raises no challenge to the Hearing Examiner's decision that Mr. Ewing 
has failed to meet his burden pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7)(a-c) and ( e ). Any issue which 
could have been raised pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7) has been waived. Kugler v. Drowns, 
119 ldaho 687, 809 P.2d 1116 (1991), Wheeler v. JDHW, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 
996 (2009). However, Mr. Ewing did not raise any I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) issues before the 
Hearing Examiner. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the 
Hearing Officer that driving privileges should be reinstated because: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation 
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of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; 
or; 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4 ), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly when 
the test was administered; or 
( e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
The burden of proof rests on the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the 
suspension of LC. § 18-8002A(7), Kane v. State, Dept. of Tramp., 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 
130 at 143 (Ct. App. 2003). 
The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for 
judicial review, I.C. § 67-5277. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. "The Court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions 
offact." Howardv. Canyon County Ed. ofCom'rs, 128Jdaho479, 915P.2d709(1996). 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) provides: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provision of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action 
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or 
decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not suppo1ied by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
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The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Aet is:" . 
. . if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded 
for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3). 
The decision of the Transportation Department must be affirmed unless the order 
violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is made upon 
unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious or 
an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Department of Transp., I 37 Idaho 33 7, 48 P. 3d 666 
(2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred 
in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been 
prejudiced. Drujfel v. State, Dept. o/Transp., 136 Jdaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002). 
Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires the Court to review "the 
agency record independently of the District Court's decision", Marshall v. Dept. o.fTramp. 
137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
The validity of'the Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedures. 
Mr. Ewing argues that the Idaho State Police Breath Alcohol Testing Standard 
Operating Procedures (BATSOPs) have no force or effect in law or that the Idaho State 
Police failed to engage in proper rulemaking when the BATSOPs were adopted. 
Mr. Ewing suggests without authority that this Court in an appeal from the District 
Court's decision on judicial review can determine that the BATSOPs adopted by the Idaho 
State Police (ISP) are invalid. Mr. Ewing does so without asking the Court pursuant to 
Idaho Code §67-5278 for a declaratory judgment of the validity of the ISPs BATSOPs. 
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Mr. Ewing failed to name or include the Idaho State Police as a party to the original 
Petition for Judicial Review. 
Mr. Ewing's failure to name the ISP as a party to this action is dispositive of any 
claim that the Court can consider the administrative action of the ISP in adopting Idaho's 
BA TSOP in this judicial review of the action of the Department. Clearly, ISP must be a 
party for the Court to consider the action of ISP, "the agency shall be made a party .... ", 
J.C. § 67-5278. 1 
1 Simply naming the State of Idaho as a party is not sufficient. The State of Idaho operates an agency model 
of administrative procedure, "agency means State Board, Commission, Department or Officer authorized by 
law to make rules or determine contested cases ... " J.C. § 67-520 I (2). 
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A collateral attack on the BATSOPs adopted by the Idaho State Police simply 
cannot be made in the judicial review of the action of the Department of Transportation's 
Hearing Examiner. 2 
The Department's Hearing Examiner hears the five issues of pursuant to LC. §18-
8002A(7) and any appropriate constitutional challenges.3 
Mr. Ewing invites the review ofldaho's BATSOPs by submitting information made 
available to Mr. Ewing apparently based upon a request pursuant to the Idaho Public 
Records Act of the Idaho State Police, not the record of the Idaho State Police's adoption 
of Idaho's BATSOPs. 
Mr. Ewing suggests that what he provided the Hearing Examiner demonstrates that 
the Idaho State Police did not engage in sufficient rulemaking. 
Mr. Ewing does not tell the Department's Hearing Examiner or the District Court 
what weight to place on any of the Idaho State Police documents or why the Court should 
conclude that Idaho's BATSOPs are invalid. Mr. Ewing supplies the assembled 
information, asserting that if the Court considers the information submitted, the Court 
2 The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act permits the Court's review of an agency's decision. 
Idaho Code § 67-5270 provides: 
( 1) Judicial review of agency action shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter unless other provision 
of law is applicable to the particular matter. 
(2) A person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a contested case is entitled to judicial 
review under this chapter if the person complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, 
Idaho Code. 
(3) A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an agency other than the industrial 
commission or the public utilities commission is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person 
complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code. Emphasis added. 
3 J.C. § I 8-8002A(7) specifies that the hearing officer "shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds" one 
of the five enumerated bases to set aside a suspension. Therefore, a hearing officer is not authorized to vacate 
a suspension based upon technical flaws in documents delivered to the !TD. Kane v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., I 39 Idaho 586 at 590, 83 P.3d 130 at 134 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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would find that the assembled information means that Idaho's BATSOPs are not valid. Mr. 
Ewing does not offer an affidavit, citation to scientific treatise, deposition or testimony of 
an expert for the Court to consider.4 
Mr. Ewing offers no factual or legal basis for the challenge to the "science" of 
Idaho's BATSOPs.5 
Mr. Ewing fails to sufficiently raise and address the issue of the BATSOPs before 
the Hearing Examiner, thereby failing to preserve the issue for this Court's review, "error 
is never presumed on appeal," In re Suspension o.f'Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 
937 at 946, 155 P.3d I 176 (Ct. App. 2006). 
4 Mr. Ewing cannot tell the Court what the Idaho State Police may have relied on in adopting Idaho's 
BATSOPs and does not produce a record of the Idaho State Police's adoption of Idaho's BATSOPs. Mr. 
Ewing is responsible for the condition of the Record he has supplied the Court, In re Mahurin, 140 Idaho 
656, 99 P.3d 125 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support his position 
with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. Randall 
v. Ganz, 96 ldaho 785, 788, 537, P.2d 65, 68 (1975). A general attack on the findings and conclusions 
of the district court, without specific references to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve 
an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445., 263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search 
the record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. Of Prof'/ Discipline, 138 Idaho 307, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 
326 (2003). Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. Nix., 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P. 3d 120, 
122 (2005). 
Bettwieser v. New York irrigation District, 154 Idaho 3 l 7, 297 P.3d311 (2013). 
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Consistent with ISP's rule making authority, ISP has adopted requirements for 
performing breath alcohol testing by rule, IDAPA 11.03.01.014.6 
(, 
014. REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFORMING BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING. 
01. Instruments. Each breath testing instrument model shall be approved by the department 
and shall be listed in the ·'Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices" 
published in the Federal Register by the United States Department of Transportation as incorporated by 
reference in section 004 of this rule. ( 4-7-11) 
02. Report. Each direct breath testing instrument shall report alcohol concentration as grams 
ofalcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath. (7-
1-93) 
03. Administration. Breath tests shall he administered in conformity with standards 
established by the department. Standards shall he developed for each type ofhreath testing instrument used 
in ldaho, and such standards shall he issued in the form of analytical methods and standard operating 
procedures. (4-7-11) 
04. Training. Each individual operator shall demonstrate that he has sufficient training to 
operate the instrument correctly. This shall be accomplished by successfully completing a training 
course approved by the department. Officers must retrain periodically as required by the department. 
(7-1-93) 
05. Checks. Each breath testing instrument shall be checked on a schedule established 
by the Department for accuracy with a simulator solution provided by or approved by the department. 
These checks shall be performed according to a procedure established by the department. 
(4-7-11) 
06. Records. All records regarding maintenance and results shall be retained for three (3) years. 
(3-19-99) 
07. Deficiencies. Failure to meet any of the conditions listed in Sections 013 and 014. Any 
laboratory or breath testing instrument may be disapproved for failure to meet one (I) or more of the 
requirements listed in sections 0 13 and 0 14, and approval may be withheld until the deficiency is corrected. 
IDAPA 11.03.01 Emphasis added 
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The Idaho State Police has adopted Idaho's BA TSOPs consistent with the authority 
found at IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03, as permitted by I.C. § 18-8004. The BATSOPs are not 
the standards of the Idaho Transportation Department. 7 
Further, judicial review is not available of the Idaho State Police's action m 
adopting the BATSOPs as a Standard Operating Procedure, IDAPA 11.03.01.8 
Mr. Ewing cannot demonstrate based on this Record that the action of the Idaho 
State Police is in any way deficient. Nor can Mr. Ewing demonstrate that there is a basis 
for the Court's review of the Idaho's BATSOPs in this judicial review of the decision of 
the Department's Hearing Examiner. 
Mr. Ewing does not provide any evidence which supports a finding that the breath 
alcohol testing was not conducted within the requirements of l.C. § § 18-8004( 4) or LC. § 
l 8-8002A(7)( d). 
7 I.C. § l 8-8002A(3) provides: 
Rulemaking authority of the ldaho state police. The Idaho state police may, pursuant to chapter 52. 
title 67, Idaho Code, prescribe by rule: 
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this section; and 
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to comply with the 
department's requirements. Any rules of the Idaho state police shall be in accordance with the 
following: a test for alcohol concentration in breath as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and 
subsection ( I )(e) of this section will be valid for the purposes of this section if the breath alcohol 
testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state police in accordance with section il.: 
8004, Idaho Code, at any time within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing. A test for 
alcohol concentration in blood or urine as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, that is reported 
by the Idaho state police or by any laboratory approved by the Idaho state police to perform this test 
will be valid for the purposes of this section. Emphasis added. 
''There is no provision for administrative appeals before the Idaho State Police under this chapter." 
IDAPA \ l.03.01.003 
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The District Court correctly determined that ISP's rules at IDAPA 11.03.01.014 
permitting the utilization of standard operating procedures to determine the appropriate 
testing standards for each breath testing instrument was lawful. 9 
Mr. Ewing simply argues that ISP should do something more or something different 
than what has been done. 
The Court's discussion in Tomorrows Hope, Inc., v. IDHW, 124 Idaho 843, 864 
P. 2 d lJ 3 0 ( 199 3) may be he! pful here. There the Court was attempting to determine 
whether the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's adoption of a policy interpretation 
by manual was an interpretation of a statutory term or a regulatory term. 
Mr. Ewing does not argue that ISP has in some fashion changed or redefined the 
original statutory directive by the adoption of standard operating procedures pursuant to 
ISP's rules. ISP may prescribe by rule what testing is required to complete evidentiary 
testing and what calibrations must be performed to comply with ISP's requirements, I.C. § 
18-8002A(3). There is no requirement that breath testing instrument approval or that 
laboratory approval by ISP must occur in some fashion other than what ISP has done. 10 
ISP adopts by rule the authority to create standard operating procedures permitted 
by l.C. § 67-5201(21). 
ISP is simply authorized to adopt breath testing procedures by rule. The choice of 
the form of breath alcohol testing procedures is clearly within the province oflSP. ISP is 
9 A standard is a "manual guideline, curriculum, specification, requirement, measurement or other 
administrative principle providing a model or pattern in comparison with which the correctness or 
appropriateness of specified actions, practices or procedures may be determined," J.C. § 67-520 I (21 ). 
10 Nor does Mr. Ewing argue that ISP's BATSOPs are really rules which inappropriately interpret I.C. § I 8-
8002A(3). 
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under no requirement to do something else. 11 
Mr. Ewing asks that the Court consider a District Court's decision determining that 
the State failed to meet its burden in a criminal case to properly lay a foundation for the 
admissibility of a breath test, however, Mr. Ewing does not provide any authority for such 
an analysis in the Administrative License Suspension setting. Mr. Ewing only argues that 
the BA TSOPs are not valid. 
Finally there is no showing that the Depmiment's Hearing Examiner should not 
have relied on the current BA TSOPs. ITD's Hearing Examiner appropriately relied on 
Idaho's current BATSOPs. 
11 The Court of Appeals has previously and clearly rejected this argument: 
Although Besaw has exposed some troubling information about the manner in which the SOPs for breath 
testing have been developed or amended, we are not persuaded that he has demonstrated that the SOP 
procedures are incapable of yielding accurate tests. Besaw contends that the SOPs are so strewn with " 
weasel words" and II wiggle room" that they lack scientific basis and permit testing procedures that will 
not yield accurate tests, but there is no evidence in the record to support that conclusion. To be sure, the 
emails and memos to and from ISP personnel are disturbing, for some comments and suggestions lacked 
any apparent regard for the way proposed changes could affect the validity of the tests. As Besaw alleges, 
some participants seemed to view the ISP's task as being to thwart all possible defense challenges to the 
admission of breath tests rather than to adopt standards that will maximize the accuracy of tests upon 
which individuals may be convicted of serious crimes and deprived of their liberty. Further, it appears 
that there was a conscious avoidance of any opportunity for suggestions or critiques from persons outside 
the law enforcement community. While we do not endorse or condone such an approach to the ISP's 
statutorily-assigned duty to define breath testing procedures and standards, we cannot say that the emails 
in and of themselves, or any other evidence in the record, establishes that the test procedures actually 
authorized by the SOPs and applied in Besaw's case are incapable of producing reliable tests. Therefore, 
we find no error in the magistrate court's denial of Besaw's motion to exclude the test results from 
evidence. 
State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013). 
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ISSUE 2 
Due Process in rhe Administrative License Suspension Hearing process. 
Mr. Ewing argues that his due process interest in his driving privileges was in some 
fashion harmed, injured, damaged or affected by either the scheduling of the 
Administrative License Suspension hearing by the Department's Hearing Examiner or the 
Hearing Examiner's failure to issue subpoenas. Mr. Ewing offers no showing of an 
unconstitutional deprivation by the Department's Hearing Examiner's scheduling of the 
hearing or failure to issue subpoenas. Mr. Ewing makes no showing of how he suffered 
irreparable harm, let alone demonstrating any harm. 12 
The constitutional issue characterized by Mr. Ewing is apparently now that the 
Department has responded to the Court of Appeals concern in Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 
that the Department waited too long after the receipt of the discovery requested by Mr. 
Ewing, to schedule the hearing, not that the hearing was scheduled too soon prior to the 
receipt of the requested discovery. 
The original notice of suspension was issued to Mr. Ewing on March 16, 2014. 
The thirty days of temporary driving privileges as provided in the original Notice of 
Suspension expired April 15, 2014, R. pp. 32-33. 
The Hearing Examiner scheduled Mr. Ewing's hearing to take place by telephone 
conference call on April 10, 2014. R. p. 91 and p. 261. 
On March 24, 2014 the Hearing Examiner issues a show cause letter indicating that 
12 It is difficult to determine whether Mr. Ewing argues that he was denied due process or if the Administrative 
License Suspension process is bereft of due process. This Court has continually upheld the Department's 
Administrative License Suspension process as constitutional, see for example Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 
151 Idaho 659,262 P.3d 1030 (Ct. ofApp.2011). 
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the hearing date has been extended beyond the 30 days set out in the original notice of 
suspension. R. p. 231. Mr. Ewing then objects to the show cause letter, R. pp. 95-96. 13 
On April 16, 2014 Ewing requests a stay of the pending suspension and the 
Department's Hearing Examiner stays the pending suspension, stopping the withdrawal 
period effective April 15, 2014, R. p. 93. On May 12, 2014 the Department's Hearing 
Examiner entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (FFCLO), making the 
Administrative License Suspension effective May 14, 2014 (R. p. 15). 
The Show Cause Letter clearly indicates that the scheduling of the hearing does not 
operate as a stay of the suspension. Mr. Ewing was advised that temporary driving 
privileges expire thirty days after the service of the Notice of Suspension. The Record 
reflects that Mr. Ewing timely made a request for a stay of the effective date of the 
suspension pending the Hearing Examiner's decision (R. pp. 49-55). 
Mr. Ewing claims that the one day suspension of April 16, 2014 results in a 
deprivation of a property right without due process which should then result in a finding 
by the Court that the remaining 89 day suspension should be vacated because the 
Department did not timely schedule the Administrative License Suspension hearing within 
thirty days of the date of the Notice of Temporary Driving Privileges. 14 
Mr. Ewing does not indicate that he suffered any harm or consequence as a result 
of the apparent one day suspension of his driving privileges, nor does Mr. Ewing indicate 
13 The Department issued what is tenned a "show cause" letter. The title of the letter is unfortunate, however, 
Mr. Ewing's show cause letter does not require that Mr. Ewing "show cause." Instead the letter notifies Mr. 
Ewing that the date of the hearing has been extended to permit the receipt of subpoenaed evidence requested 
by Mr. Ewing and in spite of its title, is clearly the Hearing Examiner's determination that good cause exists 
to extend the hearing date to accommodate the requested discovery. 
14 The Department's Hearing Examiner gave Mr. Ewing one day credit for the one day of suspension served 
by Ewing, R. p. 15. 
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that the Hearing Examiner back dated the stay of the order suspending Mr. Ewing's driving 
privileges and gave Mr. Ewing credit for one day of suspension. Mr. Ewing also fails to 
advise the Court that the Department stayed the effectiveness of the suspension pending 
the Hearing Examiner's decision, Notice of Pending Action R. p. 278. 
The Idaho Court has not yet dealt with a suspension entered after the expiration of 
the thirty days of temporary driving privileges resulting in a deprivation sufficient to 
consider setting aside the entire suspension entered by the Department's Hearing 
Examiner. 15 
The one day at issue here is not a significant, substantial or erroneous deprivation 
constituting a constitutionally cognizable harm requiring the Court to set aside the entire 
suspension of Mr. Ewing's driving privileges. 16 
The United States Supreme Court in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 US. 
230, 242, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 1788-89, 100 L.Ed.2d 265, 279 (1988) analyzes the effect of the 
delay of a decision dealing with the proposed suspension of a professional banking license. 
In Mallen, the Supreme Court inquired as to whether the proposed suspension 
hearing provided a ''prompt proceeding and a prompt disposition of the merits." The 
Mallen Court specifically indicates that an unjustifiable delay in holding a hearing could 
15 
We are not unmindful of the cumbersomeness of the above-outlined procedures. However, absent 
modification of ITD's rules and procedures, we are aware of no other method that may be employed 
to avoid a potential due process deprivation. 
Platz v. State, 154 ldaho 960, 303 P.3d 647 at 657 (Ct. App. 2013). 
16 
However, an undue delay in holding a post-suspension hearing or issuing a decision may constitute 
a deprivation of due process. Delays in administrative proceedings may not violate due process if 
the person requesting the administrative proceeding contributed to the delay. (Citations omitted). 
Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 151 Idaho 659,670,262 P.3d 1030, 1041 (Ct. App. 2011). 
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become a constitutional violation; however, the significance of such a delay cannot be 
evaluated in a vacuum, -1-86 U.S. 241. "In determining how long a delay is justified in 
affording a post suspension hearing and decision, it is appropriate to examine the 
importance of the private interests and the harm to this interest occasioned by the delay" 
-186 us 2-12. 
The apparent deprivation here is that Mr. Ewing contends he did not have driving 
privileges for one day; however, Mr. Ewing makes no other showing of the harm as a result 
of allegedly not having driving privileges for one day. 
There is no erroneous deprivation here because Mr. Ewing did not raise any of the 
I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) basis for setting aside the Administrative License Suspension before 
the Department's Hearing Examiner. 
Since Mr. Ewing did not ask the Department's Hearing Examiner to find that Mr. 
Ewing failed to meet his burden pursuant to I.C. § l 8-8002A(7), it is unlikely that the 
Hearing Examiner's decision can be set aside (see Argument, Issue IV). When Mr. Ewing 
makes no attempt to demonstrate before the Hearing Examiner that he met his burden 
pursuant to the factors ofl.C. § l 8-8002A(7) in the administrative hearing, there can be no 
erroneous deprivation justifying setting aside the Administrative License Suspension, 
Mallen, 
Mr. Ewing made a challenge before the District Court to the Hearing Examiner's 
decision based on an exhibit attached to Mr. Ewing's opening brief on judicial review, R. 
pp. 464-466. Exhibit 8 was not made part of the record before the Department's Hearing 
Examiner and is not part of the administrative record or for that matter is nothing more 
than an exhibit to Mr. Ewing's opening brief. The administrative record was not augmented 
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as permitted by statute. 
Without a demonstration before the Department's Hearing Examiner of Mr. Ewing 
meeting his burden pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7), Mr. Ewing has not demonstrated that 
the alleged one day suspension was erroneous. 17 
Mr. Ewing does not analyze either the Mathews factors or the factors set out in 
Mallen for purposes of determining whether the apparent one day suspension is a 
constitutionally cognizable harm. 18 
It is appropriate for the Hearing Examiner to ensure that Mr. Ewing has the 
discovery he requested prior to the Hearing. As the Court of Appeals cautioned in Bell v. 
Idaho Tramp. Dept. 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 1030 (Ct. App. 2011), it is unreasonable to 
expect that a driver could be sufficiently prepared for the Administrative License 
Suspension hearing without the requested discovery information. 
Finally, Mr. Ewing does not indicate that he suffered any actual harm or that there 
was a violation of any fundamental right. 19 
In a different setting, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed harm related to a parties 
standing concluding that even the existence of a known or anticipated injury may be 
17 The Record before the Department's Hearing Examiner indicates that Mr. Ewing did not offer any 
evidence, did not call any witness except to seek to have the presiding Hearing Examiner testify about the 
process of issuing subpoenas or setting hearings. 
18 
Courts must consider three factors in procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (/976). 
19 The US Supreme Court also considers that the possible length of a wrongful deprivation of benefits is an 
important factor in assessing the impact of the public action on the private interest, Mathews at p. 342. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 17 
"characterized as nonjusticiable because it is too remote to be ripe for review on one hand, 
or too remote to constitute the requisite concrete harm to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement of standing" (citations omitted) Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 
128 Idaho 371 at 381,913 P.2d1141 (1996). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 
77 4, 2 I 5 P. 3d 494, (2009) discussed the potential due process violation in the context of a 
stop work order prohibiting further construction of a building in downtown Boise. The 
Court indicates there that interim suspensions of licenses and temporary seizures of 
property may be undertaken without a pre deprivation hearing provided there is a sufficient 
factual basis for the action and that prompt administrative or judicial review of the merits 
of the decision is available. There, the Boise City's Building Official's decision to issue a 
stop work order was merely a temporary suspension of the right to perform work on the 
project. 
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In analyzing the nature of the impact on private interest of Boise Tower Associates, 
the Idaho Court concluded that the effect was minor because the decision to issue the stop 
work order was merely intermittent until a course of action could be agreed upon by the 
parties. Obviously the Boise Tower Associates suffered a potentially substantial injury by 
not being able to proceed with construction without a finding of a constitutional violation. 
Mr. Ewing on the other hand does not demonstrate that he suffered any consequence as a 
result of the one day suspension, particularly when Mr. Ewing did not create a record 
regarding his burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7) before the Department's Hearing 
Examiner. 20 
Clearly the potential impact of an alleged one day suspension of driving privileges 
awaiting the determination of whether the driving privileges should be suspended for 90 
days is not an erroneous unconstitutional deprivation. Mr. Ewing simply asks the Court to 
set aside the entirety of the 90 day suspension because there was arguably one day in which 
Mr. Ewing argues he did not have driving privileges in spite of the Hearing Examiner 
staying the effective date of the suspension. 
Further, the sufficiency and detail of the Hearing Examiner's FFCLO were 
appropriately acknowledged by the District Court. The thoroughness and completeness of 
those findings are what the Mallen Court anticipates will be made in an administrative 
hearing. Here, in this administrative setting, the Department's Hearing Examiner extended 
to Mr. Ewing the process due him in regards to his property interest in his continued driving 
privileges. 
20 Previously the Idaho Court has determined that Dennis McNeely's interest in driving privileges was not so 
substantial as to require a pre suspension hearing, although the interest may be affected by the length of the 
suspension period and the timeliness of a post suspension review proceeding, McNeely v. State, 1 I 9 Idaho 
I 82, 804 P. 2 d 9 I I (Ct. App. 1990) 
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Mr. Ewing's argument concerning the potential unconstitutional deprivation by the 
Hearing Examiner's scheduling of the Administrative License Suspension Hearing was 
considered and thoroughly rejected by the Court of Appeals In re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 304 
P. 1206 (Ct. App. 2013). 
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Additionally, "invited error" compels the same result as the Court of Appeals 
decision in Beyer. 21 
Mr. Ewing simply makes an unsupported policy and hypothetical argument of the 
worst of what could happen without demonstrating that he specifically suffered any loss, 
injury, harm or consequence as a result of the scheduling of the hearing or the Hearing 
Examiner's failure to issue subpoenas or to timely schedule the hearing. 
The District Court correctly analyzed the due process claim of Mr. Ewing. Mr. 
Ewing was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard, Aberdeen-Springfield 
Canal Co. v. Peeper, 133 Idaho 82, 982 P.2d 917 (1999) and in a meaningful manner, 
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 950 P.2d 1262 (1998). 
21 
The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own 
conduct induces the commission of the error. Thompson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, /06, 205 P.3d 
I 235, J 242 (2009). One may not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in Id. In 
short, invited errors are not reversible. Id. Thus, given that Beyer affirmatively accepted the Hearing 
Examiner's remedy at the time of the hearing, even if the hearing officer erred by not requiring the 
video to be produced until the day of the hearing, Beyer cannot complain of that error. 7 
The Court continues in the footnote: 
We have previously criticized a Hearing Examiner's practice of issuing subpoenas requiring 
compliance on the day before the scheduled hearing. We stated that such a practice is "strongly 
discouraged," but that it does not amount to a per se violation of procedural due process. Bell v. 
Idaho Transp. Dept., /51 ldaho 659,666,262 P.3d 1030, 1037 (Ct. App. 2011). The ALS hearing 
in this case was held prior to our decision in Bell but, here, compliance was ordered on the day of 
the hearing. We continue to strongly discourage this practice. We see no reason for this practice 
except to cause a disadvantage to the driver who has the burden of proof at the Administrative 
License Suspension hearing. 
In re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40,304 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Ct. App. 2013). 
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There is no unconstitutional deprivation as a result of the process extended to Mr. 
Ewing. The suspension of Mr. Ewing's driving privileges was stayed pending the decision 
of the Department's Hearing Examiner. 22 
Mr. Ewing was afforded sufiicient due process. 
ISSUE 3 
Mr. Ewing's equal protection rights. 
Mr. Ewing contends that the Hearing Examiner's decision regarding the 
scheduling of the hearing or the issuance of subpoenas violates Mr. Ewing's equal 
protection rights. Mr. Ewing does not contend that the Idaho Legislature created two 
classes of individuals who are treated differently, only that he is treated differently from 
drivers in an Administrative License Suspension hearing who do not request that the 
Department's Hearing Examiners issue subpoenas. 
Mr. Ewing must first identify the challenged classification, then determine the 
standard by which to review the classification, Tarbox v. Tax Com 'n, 107 Idaho 957, 959, 
695 P.2d 342 (1984). The third step is to determine whether the standard has been satisfied, 
State v. Breed, 1 I 1 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P2d 202, 205 (1986). 
Mr. Ewing makes a ·'class of one" argument that he is singled out based upon "a 
distinction that fails the rational basis test where the challenged treatment does not follow 
a suspect classification or punish the exercise of fundamental rights," Anderson v. 
Spalding, 137 Idaho 509., 50 P.3d 1004 (2002). Mr. Ewing correctly identifies the standard 
22 The stay Order was backdated so that Mr. Ewing's suspension, if any, would not be effective until after 
the entry of the Hearing Examiner's decision. The Hearing Examiner even gives Mr. Ewing credit for the one 
day suspension, imposing an 89 days suspension, even though he had previously backdated the effectiveness 
of the stay, R. p. 289. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 22 
under which the classifications would be reviewed, but does not indicate how he is singled 
out by the Department's action and then fails to analyze the Tarbox standard. 
As a result of the Idaho Court of Appeals analysis in Bell, the Department's Hearing 
Examiner here did two things. The Hearing Examiner initially set the hearing far enough 
in advance to ensure that the requested discovery was made available to Mr. Ewing based 
on his request for discovery (R. p. 58-70). Secondly, the Hearing Examiner at Mr. Ewing's 
request entered a stay of the Administrative License Suspension until the effective date of 
the Hearing Examiner's decision (R. p. 93). 
Mr. Ewing does not provide any facts about the nature of the subpoenas requested 
or refused. The Hearing Examiner did issue some subpoenas, however, Mr. Ewing does 
not show how the denial of the issuance of other subpoenas limited his ability to meet his 
burden as required by LC. § 18-8002A(7), particularly when he makes no effort to meet 
his burden pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7). Further there is no record that Mr. Ewing ever 
served the subpoenas which he now contends the Hearing Examiner's process for issuing 
denied him equal protection. 
Mr. Ewing has the burden of demonstrating that an unconstitutional deprivation 
occurred, State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 822 P.2d 960(1991). Just as Mr. Ewing fails to 
meet his burden pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7), Mr. Ewing fails to meet his burden to 
demonstrate that an unconstitutional deprivation of Mr. Ewing's equal protection occurred. 
Mr. Ewing does not identify any fundamental right or identify any suspect 
classifications based on drivers who request the Hearing Examiner to issue subpoenas and 
those drivers that do not request discovery or subpoenas. There is no showing that the 
Department's Hearing Examiner unduly burdened the exercise of a fundamental right for 
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equal protection purposes or that a suspect classification exists which singles out drivers 
who do discovery or request the issuance of administrative subpoenas. 
The application of the Equal Protection Clause only requires that the classification 
to the extent that a classification exists, rationally furthers a legitimate state interest, 
Anderson, 519. The Department's interest in complying with the Court of Appeals decision 
in Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dept. inFa, is clearly a legitimate state interest. 
Further, Mr. Ewing is apparently suggesting that the Department's Hearing 
Examiner should not consider a driver's discovery request and a request for the issuance 
of subpoenas when scheduling an Administrative License Suspension hearing. The 
Hearing Examiner appropriately issued subpoenas and scheduled the administrative 
hearing. 
Finally, Mr. Ewing's claim is disposed ofby the Court of Appeal's "invited error" 
analysis in Beyer, infra. 
Mr. Ewing does not meet his burden to demonstrate either that he is a legitimate 
class of one or that any suspect classification exists. Mr. Ewing's equal protection interests 
are not in play and were not affected by the Hearing Examiner's decision in scheduling the 
Administrative License Suspension hearing or in the denial of the issuance of subpoenas. 
ISSUE 4 
Mr. Ewing's burden pursuant to IC § l 8-8002A(7)(d). 
Mr. Ewing challenges initially on judicial review pursuant to I.C. § l 8-8002A(7)(d) 
whether Mr. Ewing's evidentiary test was administered pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004( 4 ). 
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Mr. Ewing did not create a record before the Hearing Examiner demonstrating that 
the evidentiary test for breath alcohol did not comply with I.C. § 18-8004(4).23 
Mr. Ewing then attaches as an Exhibit to his opening brief in support of judicial 
review to the District Court, what purports to be a Breath Testing Instrument Operations 
Log (previously referred to as Exhibit 8). Mr. Ewing asked the District Court without a 
supporting affidavit and without any additional foundation to consider the Breath Testing 
Instrument Operations Log which was not made available to the Hearing Examiner as 
proof of Mr. Ewing's having met his burden pursuant to I.C. § l 8-8002A(7). 
Mr. Ewing does not seek to augment the Record or explain why Exhibit 8 to the 
Brief in Support of Judicial Review was not made part of the Administrative Record, I.C. 
§ 67-5276. Disingenuously Mr. Ewing argues that the performance verification, found in 
the Breath Testing Instrument Operations Log, (which demonstrates that a timely 
performance verification was performed) demonstrates that Mr. Ewing has met his burden 
since there was no proof of a timely performance verification in the administrative record. 
23 
Mr. Ewing's argument to the Hearing Examiner was that there was no evidence in 
It was not the ITD's burden at the administrative hearing to prove legal cause for the stop, to prove the 
reliability of the blood alcohol tests, or to disprove any of the possible grounds for challenging a suspension 
under § 18-8002A(7). To the contrary, the statute directs that "[t]he burden of proof shall be on the person 
requesting the hearing." J.C. § l 8-8002A(7). Thus, it was Kane's burden to present evidence affirmatively 
showing one or more of the grounds for relief enumerated in § I 8-8002A(7). That is, it was his burden to 
prove that, in fact, the officer lacked legal cause to stop Kane's vehicle or that the blood test was, in fact, not 
conducted in accordance with legal requirements. This burden is not met by merely showing that documents 
in the hands of the !TD are inadequate or inadmissible to reveal whether legal cause existed or whether the 
blood test was conducted properly. Kane presented no evidence to meet his burden; his challenge to the 
suspension consisted solely of a technical attack upon the adequacy of the ITD's documentation. Because 
Kane made no prima facie showing, the ITO had no burden to present any evidence at all to the hearing 
officer. 
Kane v. State, Dept. ofTransp. 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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the record which demonstrates that a timely and sufficient performance verification was 
conducted. 
The circumstances of the performance verification are not required to be provided 
to ITD to commence the Administrative License Suspension. Mr. Ewing on the other 
hand has the burden to demonstrate that the results of the evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration should not be a basis to suspend Ewing's license as a result of the breath 
testing equipment's operation not meeting the BA TSO Ps. 
Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(5 )(b ), which outlines the requirements for providing 
service of suspension, states in relevant part: 
[T]he peace officer shall forward to the department ... a certified copy or 
duplicate original of the results of all tests for alcohol concentration, as 
shown by analysis of breath administered at the direction of the peace 
officer, and a sworn statement of the officer, which may incorporate any 
arrest or incident reports relevant to the arrest and evidentiary testing setting 
forth: 
(vi) That the person was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or 
other intoxicating substances as provided in this chapter, and that 
the results of the test indicated an alcohol concentration or the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
Emphasis added. 
Corporal Frary is not required to provide ITD with a sworn statement that a performance 
verification was perfom1ed at a particular time under particular circumstances or for that 
matter the results of the performance verification. Deputy Frary provided ITD with the 
information required by LC. § l 8-8002A(5)(b ). 
Mr. Ewing apparently asks the Court now to substitute its judgment for that of the 
Hearing Examiner without providing any explanation as to why the Hearing Examiner's 
conclusions were not supported by sufficient evidence or that any evidence exists in the 
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Administrative Record, I.C. § 67-5279, In re Trottier. 155 Idaho 17, 304 P.3d 292 (Ct. 
App. 2013). 
Mr. Ewing has simply not met his burden pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7). 
V. CONCLUSION 
The validity or reliability of the Idaho State Police's BA TSOPs are not before the 
Court on judicial review of the Department's Hearing Examiner's decision suspending Mr. 
Ewing's driving privileges. 
Failing to challenge the Department's Hearing Examiner's decision pursuant to LC. 
§ 18-8002A(7) and failing to demonstrate that the Hearing Examiner's Decision was 
arbitrary or capricious or that the Hearing Examiner's Decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence in the Record eliminates the availability of any relief to Mr. Ewing. 
Mr. Ewing suffered no constitutionally cognizable harm and such process and equal 
protection due him was provided. 
The Hearing Examiner's decision to suspend Mr. Ewing's driving privileges should 
be sustained and Mr. Ewing's driving privileges should be suspended for eighty nine days. 
DATED this __ day of February, 2015. 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
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Document was: 
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